We consider preference relations over information that are monotone: more information is preferred to less. We prove that, if a preference relation on information about an uncountable set of states of nature is monotone, then it is not representable by a utility function.
Introduction"
We would like to see it as a desideratum for normative decision theories that receipt of new information will always be appreciated." Wakker (1988) Understanding the value of information has been in the minds of economists and statisticians for a long time. There is an older literature (e.g. Blackwell (1951) , Marschak (1974) , Gould (1974) , and Allen (1983) ), and a renewed interest in the value of information in recent years (e.g. Athey and Levin (1998) , Persico (1996) , and Persico (1999) ).
In this paper we make four contributions to this literature. First we prove two impossibility theorems. We consider preference relations over information that are monotone, in the sense that more information is strictly preferred to less; we show that, if the state space is uncountable, no monotone preference relation over information can be represented by a utility function. That is, if a decision maker always prefers more information to less, his preferences over information structures cannot be represented by a utility function. The two theorems account for the two usual ways of modeling information: through partitions of the state space, and through σ-algebras.
Our result is important because it shows that utility theory is not likely to be a useful tool in the analysis of the value of information. This finding should be contrasted with the existing literature on the value of information, where utility representations are used. The use of a utility implies that preferences are not monotone. Besides making a contribution to the literature on the value of information, this result is also relevant for the literature on utility theory. In particular, economists have long studied the behavioral consequences of the existence of utility functions. For example, Koopmans (1960) showed that if a utility function for the uncountable set of infinite paths of consumption exists, the decision maker must exhibit impatience. Our result shows that if a utility function for information structures on an uncountable state space exists, the decision maker must exhibit indifference to information. 1 Our second contribution is didactic. We give a simple proof of one of our impossibility theorems when the state space is [0, 1] . We believe that this is a better example of nonrepresentability than the usual textbook example, lexicographic preferences. Lexicographic preferences are not present in many economic applications, while problems involving the value of information are common. Our method of proof is essentially the same as that of the standard textbook proof of non-representability of lexicographic preferences.
Our third contribution is to show that monotone preferences over information are the first economic example of non-representability that is essentially different from lexicographic preferences. Recently, Beardon, Candeal, Herden, Indurain and Mehta (2000) have shown that there are exactly four classes of non-representable preferences, one of which is the set of preferences that are isomorphic to lexicographic preferences. Beardon et al. (2000) argue that all economic examples of non-representability belong to the lexicographic class; we show that monotone preferences over information belong to one of the other three classes (concretely, it is a long line, see below for a definition).
Our final contribution is to show that monotone preferences over information on an uncountable state space are a violation of expected utility. Wakker (1988) suggests that (weakly) monotone preferences over information might imply expected utility. In light of our results, this is false. An expected utility maximizer's preferences induce an (indirect) utility function for information structures, and our main result shows that if preferences are monotone (and thus weakly monotone) they are not representable by a utility function.
Monotone preferences
The maintained assumption in the paper is that preferences are complete, transitive and monotone. Monotonicity in our context means that if partition (or σ-algebra) A is finer than partition (or σ-algebra) B the decision maker strictly prefers A An objection to this assumption is that a decision maker (DM) who conforms to Savage's axioms, and thus has priors over the state space, will not have monotone preferences over information if the state space is uncountable. To see this, suppose that the state space is the interval 0 1 , and that DM's priors are represented by the uniform distribution. Then DM is indifferent between total ignorance and receiving a signal that tells her if the state 1 2 has occurred or not. Ex-post knowledge of the state 1 2 may be valuable, but since it is a probability zero event the signal is worthless to DM.
The source of the problem is not simply that priors rule out a large number of atoms. There are models of non-expected utility (e.g. Schmeidler (1989) , Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) ) that allow an uncountable number of atoms. 2 Our result implies that, even for these models, a representation is impossible.
Still, we believe that monotonicity is a natural assumption for at least four reasons. First, it is dubious that, if asked, many people would be exactly indifferent between ignorance and the 1 2-signal above. It is, after all, an empirical question: what is the best behavioral assumption for the analysis of information, Savage's axioms or monotonicity? The stage is indeed set for a "paradox," if people make monotone choices over information they cannot have priors.
The question then arises: how would one test for monotonicity? 3 We now turn to this issue, by describing a choice problem where the decision maker must first choose the information structure that he finds more useful for a second choice problem involving bets. Suppose that partition τ is finer than τ , so there is an element k of τ that is the union of a collection k α of elements of τ Let k be any element of the collection k α and k c the union of the rest of the elements of the collection. The individual must first choose between τ and τ Then, after he is informed in what element of the chosen partition the true state lies, he must choose between the following acts (bets) f¨© z if the state is in k 0 otherwise and f c¨© z if the state is in k c 0 otherwise, ¤ where z is a large sum of money. This is basically the 1 2-signal example above. Our experience in classroom and seminar "experiments" is that an important proportion of people trained in probability and Bayesian decision-making, like economists, display monotone preferences in tests like this. For this reason we believe that many people do have monotone preferences.
A second reason why one should study the consequences of monotonicity was beautifully stated by Wakker (1988) in the quotation at the beginning: monotonicity is normatively a natural assumption, and therefore, its consequences must be investigated.
A third reason why monotonicity is relevant, is that the problem of whether an individual likes finer partitions is independent of, and may be more basic than, whether DM's preferences accord with Savage's theory. We may wish to analyze the robustness of a utility representation, in which case we need to analyze arbitrary preferences over information, and representation breaks down. In fact, representation rests on a large number of indifferences; any psychological wrinkle that could tilt this indifferences towards monotonicity makes any utility representation break down. In a vague sense, then, representable preferences over information are non-generic. To illustrate this point, we show how monotone preferences arise naturally if the individual is a maxminimizer. Since it has been argued that this may happen if DM is uncertainty averse, the experimental evidence that individuals dislike uncertainty suggests that monotone preferences may be empirically important. 4 A fourth reason why we think that monotone preferences are important is that introspection and a very wide body of psychological research suggest that information has intrinsic value. 5 That is, people value information not only to make contingent plans, but also for its own sake. Psychologists have long recognized the importance of anticipatory feelings related to the acquisition of information and resolution of uncertainty. For instance, anxiety theory is today one of the most active areas of research in psychology. Of course, the desire to reduce anxiety will induce monotone preferences for information. 6 Grant et al. (1998) quote a physician as saying, about tests of incurable genetic disorders, that "There are some people who, even in the absence of being able to alter outcomes, find information of this sort beneficial." In those cases, even if people have priors over the state space, preferences for information will typically be monotone.
Finally, a comment on the criticism that monotone preferences are uninteresting because they preclude expected utility is in order. Taken seriously, this view implies that we should not study any problems beyond the realm of expected utility. Then, a host of interesting questions such as, just to name an example, the relation between risk and information, could not be analyzed. 7 4 See Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) where the relation between uncertainty aversion and maxmin preferences is discussed.
5 See, for example, Grant et al. (1998) , Chew and Ho (1994) Ahlbrecht and Weber (1996) and the references cited therein.
6 On the topic of anxiety and anticipatory feelings in economics, see Caplin and Leahy (2001) . 7 See Grant et al. (1998) , Schlee (1990) , Schlee (1991 ) Machina (1989 and Safra and Sulganik (1995) for more on this topic.
The Non-representation Theorems
One strategy for modeling information is to identify information with partitions of the state space; in this model, more information signifies a finer partition. In mathematics, this approach was initiated by Hintikka (1962) , and introduced to economics by Aumann (1974) . A preference relation on the set of all partitions is monotone if finer partitions are preferred to coarser partitions. The second approach is to model an agent's information by a σ-algebra over the state space-this approach is common in statistics, but also in economics and finance. A σ-algebra represents more information than another σ-algebra if it is finer. Preferences on the set of σ-algebras are monotone if, whenever one σ-algebra is contained in another, the larger one is preferred.
In this section we prove the main results of this paper: that monotone preferences over information can not be represented by a utility function if the state space is uncountable. In the next subsection we prove the result for the partitions approach, in Theorem 1. In the following subsection we prove it for the σ-algebra approach, in Theorem 2.
Theorems 1 and 2 are independent results, as the two approaches to modeling information are not equivalent, and neither model is more general than the other (see Dubra and Echenique (2000) ).
Partitions
In this section we model information by partitions of a set of possible states of nature, Ω. A partition τ of Ω is a collection of pairwise disjoint subsets whose union is Ω; note that for each state of nature ω there is a unique element of τ that contains ω. A decision maker whose information is represented by τ is informed only that the element of τ that contains the true state of nature has occurred. In other words, the decision maker cannot distinguish between states that belong to the same element of τ.
A preference relation on a set X is a complete (total), transitive binary relation on X. Throughout this note, the symbol will stand for a preference relation. A preference relation is representable if there is a function u : X R such that x y if and only if u x u y . Let Ω be the set of all partitions of Ω.
Monotonicity is a natural assumption on preferences: if τ is a finer partition than τ, then ¥ ¥ ¥ τ contains more information. 8 The intuition is the following. Suppose a decision maker has information represented by τ . When state ω occurs, she is informed of the event B τ . That is, she knows that some state in B has happened, but does not know which one exactly. If her information had been represented by τ, she would have known that a certain event A
occurred. In this case, she could not rule out states in A but not in B, whereas, if her partition is τ , she would know that states in A B did not occur.
We now state our main theorem. It establishes that when the state space is uncountable, preferences that prefer more information to less cannot be represented by a utility function.
Theorem 1 Let Ω be uncountable. If on Ω is monotone then it is not representable.
Remark. Although all the theorems in this note are stated for complete preorders, the proofs show that the theorems hold for possibly incomplete preorders. For example, Theorem 1 would say that if an incomplete preference relation is monotone, there does not exist a representable proper extension. 9 All proofs, except that of Proposition 3, are presented in the appendix. To gain some intuition for why the theorem is true, recall that the representation of a preference relation is always a matter of how large indifference curves are-at one extreme, if an agent is indifferent between all elements of her choice set, then her preferences are represented by any constant function. Here, monotonicity of preferences over a large set, the set of partitions of an uncountable set, implies the existence of "too many" indifference curves. The proof of Proposition 3, in turn, gives a more precise intuition for why Theorem 1 is true. ¡
σ algebras
In statistics and finance, but also in economics (see for example Allen (1983) ), the information possesed by an individual is often modeled through a σ-algebra, and not a partition, on the space of states of nature. In this model, there is a primitive measurable space Ω F , and information is identified with sub-σ-algebras of F Let Ω 2 Ω be the primitive measurable space. Let
( )
Ω be the set of all σ-algebras on 
Theorem 1 junior grade
Theorems 1 and 2 show that utility theory is not a useful tool in the analysis of the value of information. Besides this substantive contribution, we can also make a didactic contribution by providing a simple example of non-representability. The canonical example of nonrepresentability is lexicographic preferences, but the only place students of economics find lexicographic preferences is in discussions of representability. We believe that preferences over information is a more relevant example of non-representability. 
Remark. Non-representability in general uncountable subsets of R can be proven by a slight modification of the proof of proposition 3.
An example: Maxmin Preferences
An expected-utility-maximizer does not have monotone preferences over information. Here we present an example of a decision problem with maxmin preferences, under our assumptions, the derived value of information is such that being informed in a particular state makes DM always strictly better off. Because of this monotonicity, her preferences are not representable by a utility. Let Ω¨¢ £ 0 1 and P a set of probability measures on Ω. DM must choose an element (action) in A¨¢ £ 0 1 after observing a signal about the state of nature. Her state-contingent utility is given by u ω a @ E S T S ω a 2 (e.g. DM is a statistician seeking to minimize the mean squared error). We will assume that DM is a maxminimizer, so the utility in event B when action a is chosen is
We need maxU B a to be well defined, so that a B , the optimal action in event B exists. For example, if P contains all degenerate priors on Ω, then maxU B a is well defined. To see this, let B stand for the closure of B and a B a
a 2 we have that U B a u a B a Therefore, U B a is a continuous function of a and a B , the optimal action in event B is well defined.
A set P of probability measures over Ω is broad if the set of ω Ω such that p ω e d 0 for some p P is uncountable. This is the case, for example, if P contains all degenerate probability measures. Natural choices of P are broad, for example the set of all priors, or, given a prior p, the "ε-contaminated" set of all εp f g 1 S ¥ ¥ ε p for arbitrary p . 10 We will assume that DM's preferences over partitions satisfy the following axiom.
Dominance. If for all ω Ω,
and there exists˜ω and p P with p˜ω d 0 such that the above inequality is strict, then τ u τ¥ r ¡ ¥ t ¡ DM is comparing two partitions τ and τ In doing so, she imagines herself in a fixed event
k τ ω Suppose she realizes that the utility she would obtain by choosing the τ-optimal action in any of the states in that event is weakly larger than that she would obtain from the τ -optimal action. Suppose in addition that DM believes that, with positive probability, a state will occur in which, choosing the optimal action under τ will make her strictly better off than choosing the optimal action under τ Then she should strictly prefer partition τ over τ We shall assume that DM uses Bayesian updating on all priors in P, this is for simplicity, there are other choices (Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1993) .
Proposition 4 Let be a preference relation over w ¡ Ω If P is broad, U B a is continuous for all B and satisfies dominance, then is not representable. x d
Remark. If dominance is strengthened so that the conclusion follows without requiring p ω 0, then we obtain non-representation also for expected utility. We use maxmin as a natural way of incorporating multiple priors, and thus an uncountable number of atoms.
Recovering the representation.
Given the negative result in Theorem 1, one may wonder under what conditions one can recover a utility representation for preferences for information. In this section we discuss the existence of a representation when Ω is countable, and then present two alternative models that yield a representation, and comment on their relative merits. In what follows we will only deal with the partitions model because we believe that this is the more natural way to model information.
Countable Ω
It is natural to ask if Theorem 1 can be strengthened to countable Ω. Example 5 shows that it can not. When Ω is countable, there are monotone preferences over information that are representable. Example 5 may be somewhat misleading, though. We show (Theorem 6) that, if preferences are monotone, but individual states are still relatively unimportant, then there is a utility if and only if Ω is finite. 
Example 5 Consider
@ ∑ b a k N A k / 0 inf A k ¡
Then u represents a monotone preference relation over information on Ω (namely the preference relation induced by u).
Let Ω be a set and a preference relation on !
Ω . An element ω Ω is an atom for if, for any A # Ω with ω A and at least two elements,
A c . A state of nature is an atom if the decision maker gains relatively little from being perfectly informed about this state-in the sense that any partition that is preferred over A A c is also preferred over 
Priors on Ω and worthless states.
We argued in the Introduction that the existence of priors on the set of states of nature could imply that preferences are not monotone. We present a simple model where a utility representation for partitions arises. Ve r s i o n s of this model are used in many papers on the value of information (e.g. Blackwell (1951) and Athey and Levin (1998) ).
We shall now rule out intrinsic preferences for information, and only consider preferences for information derived from the role of information in guiding choices.
There is a set Ω of states of nature. DM must choose an action, an element in a compact set A, after observing a signal about the state of nature. DM's prior knowledge is represented by the probability measure µ over Ω, given a probability space Ω F µ . In this section, Ω will stand for the set of measurable partitions. Let u : Ω A R be DM's (measurable) statecontingent utility function. Given any partition τ Ω and ω Ω, let k τ ω be the element of τ that contains ω. When ω is realized, the decision maker is informed that an element in k τ ω has occurred. Let
u˜ω a dµ˜ω so that for each ω, a ω is DM's optimal choice, given her signal k τ ω (in fact the selection a ¡ can be taken to be measurable). We say that a preference relation on Ω is derived from priors if it is represented by a utility function U :
for some action space A u : Ω A ¡ R and beliefs µ As a trivial corollary of Theorem 1, we obtain the following result.
Corollary 7 If
on Ω is monotone and Ω is uncountable, then is not derived from priors.
¦
To see why the resulting preference relation is not monotone, let all singleton sets be measurable (i.e. ω § F for all ω Ω) and note that all but a countable number of ω have zero probability. Then, since it is worthless to be perfectly informed in a zero probability event, DM's utility is not higher after a refinement of a zero probability ω. Thus, requiring that DM has priors is like reducing the size of Ω¡ Note that the construction of U requires a good deal of faith in the setup. If we wish to analyze the robustness of the U construction we would need to consider preferences over Ω , and representation is no longer guaranteed.
Finite Action Space.
The value of more information, of a finer partition, is that DM has less restrictions on her choice of action. DM must choose the same action at states that she cannot distinguish between, so a finer partition eases some restrictions and thus must make DM (weakly) better off. If DM faces a limited number of alternative actions, more information may not always make a difference-DM will not strictly gain from more information. Thus, a limit on the number of possible choices has much the same effect as the existence of priors, it limits the value of being informed in particular states. The setup in this sub-section is the same as in 3.2, only we now allow for more general preferences 
Preferences over information are not lexicographic d
"So the answer to the crucial question in utility theory about whether or not the only non-representable preference relation is essentially the Debreu (lexicographic) chain is, somewhat informally, yes provided that we do not want examples based on ordinal numbers with large cardinality." Beardon et al. (2000) Theorem 9 below shows that a monotone preference over an uncountable state space is essentially different from lexicographic preferences. As was shown in Proposition 3 one can build an example of a non representable preference relation that makes no explicit use of ordinal numbers. Still, of course, the reason why representability fails is the large cardinality of the set of all partitions on Ω : non-representability in Theorem 1 comes from the existence of too many partitions to be ranked strictly. The existence of a utility would imply that there are "only" a continuum many partitions that can be strictly ranked.
The dual order of a given ordered set X f e Beardon et al. (2000) show that, if
is long, it is not order-isomophic to the lexicographic line. So, our non-representation theorem is essentially different from the lexicographic result.
Concluding Remarks
In large sets, the representation of a decision maker's preferences by a utility depends on the "size" of her indifference curves. At one extreme, if DM is indifferent between all possible states her preferences are trivially representable; this is also the case if DM has a finite number of indifference curves. Preferences over information are typically weakly monotone, in the sense that more information is weakly preferred to less. We show that if indifference is ruled out for a large enough set of states by requiring strict monotonicity, there is no utility representation for preferences over information.
The question of weak vs. strict monotonicity is reminiscent of preferences over sequences of outcomes in repeated games. The "overtaking criterion" assumes that no outcome in an individual time period is important, while the "discounting criterion" assumes that a change in payoffs in any single time period makes a difference. Here, as in repeated games, both assumptions have their merit. But, unlike in repeated games, here they give very different conclusions. When individual states are unimportant (e.g. because of Savage's axioms, or because there are few alternative actions) there is a utility, but when enough states are important there is none. In our opinion this implies that any representation of preferences over information is not robust to changes in the environment. 
Note that τ ω is finer than τ ω , and that if ωˆ¥ ω, then τ ω 
ω To each ω we associate two σ algebras σ ω and σ ω defined by ( 4 Ω p R that represents . Monotonicity ensures that one can assign to each ω a rational r ω such that
and r is injective, a contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 4.
We now show that, if a partition τ is a "one-point refinement" of τ then τ u ¥¡ Since Ω is not finite, it has uncountably many subsets like A, hence Z could not be countable. By Birkhoff's theorem, there is no utility representation. space, C Ω A is a separable metric space (see Aliprantis and Border (1999, Theorem 3.85) 
